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COMMENTS
"A MODEST PROPOSAL" FOR DEFINING "GROSS
MISCONDUCT" FOR COBRA COVERAGE
DISQUALIFICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written since the enactment of Title X of the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 19851 discuss-
ing, analyzing, and deciphering the controversial title.2 In general,
COBRA requires certain employers to offer continued group health
insurance coverage to qualified employees and their beneficiaries.
This coverage is triggered by specified events3 which would other-
wise cause the cessation of employees' or their beneficiaries' em-
ployer-provided group health insurance coverage." COBRA made
identical amendments to the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), 6 and
the Public Health Services Act,7 implementing this required
1. Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 81, 222-37
(Title X of the Act codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1991)). The 1985 Act was
not actually signed into law until April 7, 1986. Title X of the Act, which is titled Private Health
Insurance Coverage but is more commonly referred to as COBRA, was effective, generally, for
plan years beginning on or after July 1, 1986. Id. For the purposes of this Note, COBRA refers to
Title X.
2. The controversial nature of the passage of Title X of the 1985 Act is reflected in the re-
sponses of various commentators in the employee benefits arena. See Barry Newman, What Court
Decisions on COBRA Coverage Denials Mean to Employers, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS,
May-June 1991, at 18 (noting that many employers and members of the employee benefits com-
munity were "caught completely by surprise"); James P. O'Sullivan, COBRA: A New Law Re-
quires Immediate Attention to Group Health Plans, 22 ARIz. B.J. 8, 8 (1987) (stating that Title
X was passed with "little fanfare" but required employers' prompt attention). Others have gone so
far as to spoof how certain "Hill staffers had stuffed [Title X] there [in COBRA 1985] because
they could never have gotten it passed if Congress had had the opportunity to consider it carefully
and vote on it separately." Ethan Lipsig, 1988 Tax Analysts (Tax Notes), June 13, 1988.
3. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing and defining a qualifying event).
4. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing and defining a covered employee).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
6. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9510 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
coverage.'
One specific provision of COBRA, however, has received notice-
ably limited attention. This provision provides that employers need
not offer continued health insurance coverage to employees termi-
nated for "gross misconduct." The proposed regulations to CO-
BRA, the numerous subsequent amendments to COBRA, and legal
commentators merely restate the language of the provision. There is
virtually no analysis or discussion of what constitutes gross miscon-
duct or how this provision should be applied.
Given this limited attention, relying on and applying this provi-
sion remains a problem area for affected employers. Employers who
rely on their own interpretation of gross misconduct may later dis-
cover they wrongfully denied coverage to otherwise entitled employ-
ees or plan beneficiaries. As a result, such employers may find they
must provide retroactive health coverage as well as pay federal sanc-
tions for failing to comply with COBRA."0 The problem of defining
gross misconduct persists because neither COBRA as amended, nor
the proposed regulations, provide a workable definition of the
term." Both also fail to provide useful guidelines interpreting the
statute.' 2 Employers need guidance to arrive at a definition of gross
misconduct which is both consistent with the purpose of COBRA
and useful in ensuring compliance.'3
Employers are merely told that they are to operate their group
health plans "in good faith compliance with a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the statutory requirements"' 4 as well as in compliance with
8. H.R. REP. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 562-63 (1985).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(2). See also I.R.C. § 4980(B)(f)(3)(B); ERISA § 603.
10. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions for noncompliance).
11. The proposed regulations are found at 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987). The legislative history
of COBRA suggests a possible explanation for the lack of guidance. The original purpose was to
provide continued employer-provided health insurance to employees' spouses, mostly women, and
dependent children left uninsured because of the death of, or divorce from, an employee. In its
final form, however, the enlarged purpose of COBRA was expanded, without analysis, to also
provide continued coverage to employees who terminate employment and would otherwise be
faced with a gap in health coverage.
12. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987).
13. This definition, once found, should be included in relevant group health plan documents and
COBRA implementation rules. Many Questions Generated at Seminar on COBRA's Termination
Requirements, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 1305 (July 28, 1986) [hereinafter COBRA Semi-
nar]. In July 1986, at a New Hampshire seminar for employers on the subject of COBRA contin-
uation requirements, one speaker stated that the definition of gross misconduct "ultimately rests
with the employer." Id. He recommended employers define the term clearly in their COBRA
implementation rules. Id.
14. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1985).
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the proposed regulations issued on June 15, 1987.1" Not only must
employers interpret what Congress meant by gross misconduct, but
also what constitutes "good faith"; both terms defy consistent inter-
pretation. Currently, these definitions must be gleaned without stat-
utory or regulatory guidance from Congress or the Internal Revenue
Service, The challenge is to draft both a definition of gross miscon-
duct and explanatory regulations that, if followed, will ensure that
an employer is in "good faith" compliance with COBRA's gross
misconduct provision.16
This Comment reviews three possible options for defining gross
misconduct. The first option is for employers simply to use a diction-
ary definition. The second is to review how analogous areas of law
define and apply terms which are similar to gross misconduct. The
two areas of analogous law discussed here are state unemployment
insurance law and relevant federal employee health benefits law.
The third and final option discussed here is to convince Congress to
amend COBRA to add a uniform statutory definition of gross mis-
conduct and to pressure the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) into
issuing regulations that provide substantive guidance specifically ad-
dressing gross misconduct.17
A discussion of COBRA legislative history and the proposed reg-
ulations is included in the Background section. This section also dis-
cusses the various interpretations of COBRA's gross misconduct
provision and a review of the three employer options. Special atten-
tion is given to the second option, areas of analogous law, because it
offers the most insight into drafting a uniform definition of gross
misconduct. Ultimately, the Analysis and Conclusion sections argue
that the best solution is the third option: to amend COBRA to in-
clude a single, uniform definition of gross misconduct. To this end, a
suggested uniform statutory definition of gross misconduct and reg-
ulatory language is proposed in the Appendix.
15. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987). See also Employers Should Make "Good Faith" Efforts to
Comply With COBRA Health Care Provisions, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1151 (June 23,
1986) [hereinafter Employer "Good Faith" Efforts] (noting that according to a BNA interview of
employer representatives, benefits consultants, insurers, and others, employers should make an
attempt to comply with the Health Benefits Act in good faith).
16. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987).
17. The Joint Conference Committee divided responsibility for issuing explanatory regulations
between the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Health
& Human Services to avoid duplication. H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 562-63.
1992]
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I. BACKGROUND
The concern over availability and accessibility of health care was
a catalyst to the enactment of COBRA.'" The overall goal of CO-
BRA, to offer the option of continuing health coverage under em-
ployer-sponsored group health plans upon cessation of such cover-
age, addresses this concern. 9 ' According to a 1985 study by the
Department of Health and Human Services, since 1977 the number
of Americans without health insurance had increased 40% to be-
tween twenty-five and thirty-five million people.20
The original proponents of continued health coverage were partic-
ularly concerned with the plight of employees' family members.21
Family members, such as spouses, former spouses, and dependent
children, who received their insurance through an employer-pro-
vided group health plan, generally lost this coverage upon the death
of, or divorce from, an employee.22 Without employer-provided
health insurance, these family members were forced to pay costly
individual health insurance rates, and in many cases were unable to
obtain health insurance at all.2 3 With these concerns in mind, both
houses of Congress began introducing legislation addressing contin-
ued employer-provided health coverage.
18. H.R. REP, No, 300, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 (1985). Most people obtain their health
insurance through their employers. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, A CBO STUDY, SELECTED
OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 12 (July 1991) [hereinafter Ex-
PANDING HEALTH INSURANCE]. Therefore, according to the Congressional Budget Office, access,
or lack of access, to employer-provided coverage is "the most important factor that determines
whether or not people are insured." Id.
19. H.R. REP. No. 300, supra note 18, at 308. See also H.R. 21, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
S. 1632, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introducing the original proposals for continued employer-
provided health coverage).
20. H.R. REP. No. 300, supra note 18, at 308. A 1991 CBO Study estimates that 33.4 million
people, or 13.6% of the U.S. population, were uninsured in March 1990. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, A CBO STUDY, RISING HEALTH CARE COSTS 69 (April 1991). According to a
national survey conducted in 1987, the American population includes 36.1 million uninsured per-
sons. THE ROBERT WOOD FOUNDATION, CHALLENGES IN HEALTH CARE: A CHARTBOOK PERSPEC-
TIVE 1991 104 (1991). This survey also determined that 59% of the uninsured between the ages
of 18 and 64 are members of families in which at least one person works. Id.
21. H.R. 21, supra note 19, at 363; S. 1632, supra note 19. With a 21.8% uninsured rate,
adults and children living in single-parent families are the most likely to be uninsured. Ex-
PANDING HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 18, at 9. Characteristically, the uninsured also include
young adults and the poor and near-poor. Id.
22. H.R. 21, supra note 19; S. 1632, supra note 19.
23. H.R. 21, supra note 19; S. 1632, supra note 19.
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A. Legislative History of COBRA
Prior to the enactment of COBRA, no federal law required em-
ployers who sponsored group health plans to offer continued cover-
age.2" However, tax advantages were, and still are, available to both
employers and employees, providing incentives for employers to offer
health insurance benefits.2" For example, employer contributions
used to fund health benefit plans are tax deductible to the em-
ployer.2" In addition, employees can deduct from their gross income
any employer contributions, made on such employee's behalf, to a
plan providing accident and health coverage.27 Also, benefits paid to
employees are not subject to income, social security, or unemploy-
ment tax.2" The COBRA legislation surfaced as an addition to these
existing tax incentives.
1. Legislation from the House of Representatives
In 1985, Representatives Peter Stark of California and William
Clay of Missouri co-sponsored a bill addressing the concern over ac-
cess to continued health coverage.29 This bill, House Bill 21, pro-
posed mandating availability of continued health insurance under
employer-sponsored plans for surviving and former spouses and de-
pendents of covered employees."0 The continued health coverage, if
accepted by a spouse or dependent, would be extended for five years
after the event (i.e., the death of, or divorce from, an employee)
which qualified them for continued coverage.31 In other words, the
intent was to turn coverage-disqualifying events into coverage-quali-
fying events.
House Bill 21 did not address continued coverage for terminated
employees.3 2 However, this bill was followed by a companion bill in
the Senate, and by subsequent Senate amendments, which proposed
24. S. REP. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
25. Id. at 362.
26. Id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 106 (1991) (stating that contributions by an employer to qualified
accident and health plans are deductible); Id. § 162 (stating that ordinary and necessary business
expenses are deductible); Id. § 212 (defining allowable deductions).
27. S. REP. No. 146, supra note 24, at 362.
28. Id. When effectively communicated, such tax-favored benefits provide a means for employ-
ers to attract and retain quality employees. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDA-
MENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 177-79 (4th ed. 1990).
29. H.R. 21, supra note 19.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. H.R. 3128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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expanding the group of potential beneficiaries.
2. Legislation from the Senate
Also in 1985, Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania, sponsored
Senate Bill 1632.13 This bill modified House Bill 21 to cover not
only family members of deceased or divorced employees, but also
family members of employees who become eligible for Medicare.34
This modification recognized that, like death or divorce, when an
employee becomes eligible for Medicare, the employee and his or
her beneficiaries become ineligible for coverage under the employer
plan. Coverage under this bill would have been extended for only
two years, following death, divorce, or Medicare-eligibility.35 At the
end of this two year period, however, individuals receiving continued
coverage would have the option of converting to individual
coverage.36
Although the general concept of these first two bills was incorpo-
rated into what eventually became COBRA, the original focus and,
thus, the purpose were altered. The early bills did not provide con-
tinued coverage to terminated employees and their families.3 7 How-
ever, subsequent amendments sponsored by the Senate changed
this. s
For example, Senate Bill 1730 required that the opportunity for
continuing one's health coverage also be offered to laid-off workers
and their families, thus enlarging the group of covered individuals.39
This step appeared to bring the pre-COBRA legislation in line with
the purpose of unemployment insurance - namely, to protect work-
ers during a period of involuntary unemployment. However, the next
proposed Senate amendment expanded the coverage still further to
include employees who terminated employment voluntarily or invol-
untarily, except if terminated "for cause."40 This amendment also
33. S. 1632, supra note 19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Employers would have been allowed, as they are allowed under COBRA, to charge
qualified beneficiaries who accept the continued coverage 102% of the group rate. Id. This bill
also detailed employer requirements to notify eligible employees and beneficiaries of their rights to
continue coverage and provided that any individual electing to receive continued coverage would
bear the cost of the premium. Id.
37. H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 563.
38. Id.
39. S. REP. No. 146, supra note 24, at 453-54.
40. H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 564.
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covered employees whose hours were reduced and who, as a result,
were no longer eligible for health coverage. 4'
3. The Final Pre-COBRA Phase
The final version of COBRA was drafted by a Joint House and
Senate Conference Committee which combined the original concept
of the earlier bills and the Senate amendments.42 The result was
very different from the original concept, which was to provide pro-
tection to women and dependent children from the burdens accom-
panying the loss of health insurance.43 As enacted, COBRA covers
not only the individuals the original bill specifically intended to
cover, but also most voluntarily and involuntarily terminated em-
ployees.44 While the potential number of covered individuals was
thus enlarged under the final version of COBRA, the provision al-
lowing employers to disqualify certain involuntarily terminated em-
ployees was narrowed.45 The Senate proposal that employees termi-
nated "for cause" not qualify for continued coverage was replaced
during Conference Committee by the stricter standard of termina-
tion for "gross misconduct. 46
These amendments were accompanied by little or no analysis or
explanation of what the amendments would mean or how they
would be applied in practice. The problems that accompany legisla-
tion which has developed in this manner are reflected in the lan-
guage of COBRA, subsequent regulations, and employer attempts
to comply.
B. COBRA 1985 - The Act
The legislation that became known as COBRA was finally signed
into law in 1986."' COBRA requires certain "employers" 48 who pro-
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 131 CONG. REC. H4012 (daily ed. June 6, 1985) (stating that 85% of health insurance is
provided through the principal wage earner's work, and as a result, six million widows and di-
vorced women are left without insurance).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(2) (providing an insurance continuation right due to loss of coverage
resulting from termination, other than for gross misconduct, of the covered employee's
employment).
45. HR. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 565.
46. Id.
47. The 1985 Act was not signed into law until April 7, 1986. Consolidated Omnibus Reconcil-
iation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 81, 222-237 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
1161-1168 (1991)).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(4).
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vide a "group health plan""9 to offer each qualified "covered em-
ployee,"5 or each covered employee's "qualified beneficiary"5  who
would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a "qualifying
event, ' 52 the option of continuing the same coverage he or she was
receiving at the time of the qualifying event. 3 The period of cover-
age depends on the nature of the qualifying event," and a person
electing to continue health coverage under the employer's group
health plan can be charged a premium of up to 102% of the group
rate. 5 As mentioned earlier, failure to comply with COBRA may
result in extensive sanctions against the noncomplying employer. 6
Before going any further, it is worth discussing more fully several
of the terms referred to above.
1. Definitions of Relevant Terms
For purposes of COBRA, "employer" generally refers to any em-
ploying entity that provides group health coverage. 7 Employer
group health plans not affected by COBRA include: 1) plans of em-
49. Id. § 1161.
50. Id. § 1167(2).
51. Id. § 1167(3).
52. Id. § 1163.
53. Id. § 1161.
54. The period of coverage begins on the date of the qualifying event and ends not earlier than:
- 18 months from the termination or reduction in hours of a covered employee's employment; and
- 36 months from the death of a covered employee, divorce or legal separation from a covered
employee, bankruptcy proceedings, a covered employee's entitlement of Medicare, or cessation of
a covered employee's child as a dependent. Id. § l162(2)(A)(i)-(v).
If another qualifying event occurs within the 18-month period following a termination or reduc-
tion in hours, except a bankruptcy proceeding, the period of coverage will be extended 12 months,
or 36 months from the original qualifying event. Id. Further, if at the time of termination or
reduction in hours a covered employee is disabled for purposes of Medicare eligibility, and notifies
the employer of this before the end of the 18-month period, such employee is entitled to have the
period of coverage extended 11 months, or a total of 29 months. Id.
An individual's continued coverage, once offered and accepted, may be terminated in several
ways. In addition to the natural expiration of the coverage period, coverage may also be termi-
nated if: 1) the employer terminates the plan and offers no group health plan to any employee; 2)
the qualified beneficiary fails to pay the premiums within 30 days after the due date; 3) the
qualified beneficiary becomes eligible under any other group health plan which does not exclude
any preexisting condition or the qualified beneficiary becomes eligible for Medicare; or 4) a Medi-
care disabled employee ceases to be disabled and is once again eligible for non-COBRA coverage.
Id. § 1162(2)(B)-(E).
55. Id. See also 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,731 (1987).
56. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
57. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,720 (1987) (cross-referencing I.R.C. § 414(b),(c),(m), and (o)).
An "employer" includes all members of a controlled group of a corporation, a group of partner-
ships or proprietorships under common control, and any successor employer or entity. Id.
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ployers who employed fewer than twenty employees on a typical
business day in the calendar year immediately preceding the calen-
dar year in which the failure to comply occurred; 58 2) plans of the
federal government and its subdivisions; 59 and 3) any church plan. 60
A "group health plan" refers to an insured or self-insured em-
ployee welfare benefit plan6' which provides medical care coverage
to plan participants through, for example, insurance or reimburse-
ment."2 "Participants" in a'plan may include employees, former em-
ployees, or employee family members. 3
A "covered employee" is an employee who is eligible for coverage
and is actually covered under the employer-sponsored group health
plan, by virtue, of his or her employment, at the time of a qualifying
event." ' A "qualified beneficiary" is any individual who is a benefi-
ciary under the plan because he or she is a covered employee's
spouse or dependent child at the time of the qualifying event.6 5 A
covered employee may also be a qualified beneficiary, but only in
the case of his or her own termination or reduction in hours of em-
ployment which results in the loss of coverage.6 6 For example, if an
employee who is covered under an employer-provided group health
plan quits her job, she is both a covered employee and a qualified
58. Small-employer plans - group health plans sponsored by one or more employers, each of
which maintain fewer than twenty employees on 50% of its working days during the preceding
calendar year - are not affected by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1161(b); 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,721
(1987) (proposed June 15, 1987). See also 26 U.S.C. § 4980B(d)(l) (1991) (including the identi-
cal provision in the Internal Revenue Code portion of the United States Code).
59. 26 U.S.C. § 4980(d)(2) (1991) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 414(d) which defines government
plans).
60. Id. 4980(c)(3).
61. S. REP, No. 146, supra note 24, at 364. An employee welfare benefit plan is defined as any
plan, fund, or program established or maintained by an employer or employee organization, or
both, for the purpose of providing participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of in-
surance or otherwise: medical, surgical, or hospital benefits or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death, or unemployment. Such benefits may also include vacations, appren-
ticeship or training programs, day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services. 29
U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1991); see also ERISA § 213(d).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(1) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)). In Question & Answer 7 of the proposed
rules, the IRS explains that an employer sponsored group health plan includes plans provided
through insurance, reimbursement, or otherwise (e.g., self-insured), and cafeteria plans or other
flexible benefit arrangements. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,720 (1987).
63. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,720 (1987).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(2). Examples include retired or former employees still covered under the
employer plan pursuant to previous employment, agents (or independent contractors), and corpo-
rate directors. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,724 (1987). Employees who are eligible for coverage but
choose not to be covered are not covered employees. Id.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1167(3)(A).
66. Id. § 1167(3)(B).
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beneficiary for purposes of COBRA. If this same employee instead
continues working and divorces her spouse, she retains her plan eli-
gibility and is not a qualified beneficiary. In both situations, the
spouse and any dependent children who lose coverage are qualified
beneficiaries.
A "qualifying event" is an event which would, but for COBRA,
result in the loss of health coverage.6" The statutory qualifying
events include: 1) the death of a covered employee;6 8 2) the termina-
tion (other than by reason of such employee's gross misconduct), or
reduction in hours of the covered employee's employment;69 3) the
divorce or legal separation of the covered employee from his or her
spouse;70 4) the covered employee becoming eligible for Medicare
benefits;71 5) a dependent child of the covered employee ceasing to
be dependent;72 and 6) a bankruptcy proceeding of an employer
which would result in loss of coverage to a covered retired
employee.7
From these definitions, it is apparent that legislators took great
pains to define many of the terms used in COBRA. Nevertheless,
conspicuous in its absence is a definition of gross misconduct.
2. Noncompliance Sanctions
In light of the potential for extensive sanctions, employers are es-
pecially concerned about complying with COBRA. In addition to
retroactive liability for wrongfully denying continued coverage, a
noncomplying employer and certain employees could be subject to
three types of sanctions. These include: 1) an employer excise tax of
$100 for each day of noncompliance, but not more than $200 a day
where there is more than one qualified beneficiary affected by a sin-
gle qualifying event;74 2) a denial of an income exclusion of any
67. Id. § 1163. See also 1.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3); ERISA § 603.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(1); see also I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3)(A); ERISA § 603(1).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(2); see also I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3)(B); ERISA § 603(2).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(3); see also I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3)(C); ERISA § 603(3).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(4); see also I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3)(D); ERISA § 603(4).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(5); see also I.R.C. § 4980B(f)(3)(E); ERISA § 603(5).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 1163(6). The bankruptcy proceeding qualifying event was added by the Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 2075. See also I.R.C. §
4980B(f)(3)(F); ERISA § 603(6).
74. I.R.C. § 4980B. The noncompliance period is the period which begins on the date when the
employer fails to comply and ends on the date when the employer complies or six months after the
last day the affected qualified beneficiary's coverage expires, whichever occurs first. Id. §
4980B(b)(2). An employer will not be subjected to the tax if it did not discover the failure while
[Vol. 42:463
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amount spent on the health coverage for certain highly compensated
employees of the noncomplying employer; 5 and 3) additional em-
ployer "non-tax" sanctions under ERISA.76 Injured parties may also
pursue private legal action for injunctive relief and civil penalties
against noncomplying employers.77
C. Proposed Regulations and Subsequent COBRA Amendments
When drafting the final version of COBRA, to avoid duplication
the Joint House and Senate Conference Committee divided the re-
sponsibilities for promulgating regulations among the Secretary of
the Department of Labor (DOL), the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS), and the Secretary of the Treasury
(through the Internal Revenue Service). 78 The DOL is responsible
for issuing regulations explaining implementation and procedures
for reporting and disclosure.7 9 The HHS is responsible for regula-
tions addressing the requirement that state and local governments
provide health coverage.8 ° Finally, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) is responsible for regulations defining coverage, deductions,
exercising reasonable diligence, nor if the failure was for reasonable cause and is corrected within
30 days. Id. § 4980(B)(c)(l)-(2). Limits are also placed on the maximum tax imposed in any
taxable year where the failure is unintentional. Id. § 4980B(c)(4). This excise tax sanction re-
placed the former denial of an employer's tax deduction for all plan contributions and expenses in
1988. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3616
(adding § 4980B to the Internal Revenue Code). See also H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at
562; 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,718 (1987) (detailing sanctions requirements in Questions & An-
swers 2 and 3).
75. H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 562-63; 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,718 (1987) (explain-
ing the sanction against the highly compensated in Question & Answer 2): A highly compensated
employee is any employee who, during the year or preceding year:
(A) was at any time a 5-percent owner,
(B) received compensation from the employer in excess of $75,000,
(C) received compensation from the employer in excess of $50,000 and was in the
top-paid group of the employer for such year, or
(D) was at any time an officer and received compensation greater than 50 percent
of the amount in effect under section 415(b)(l)(A) for such plan year.
26 U.S.C. § 414(q)(I)(A)-(D) (1991).
76. H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 562; 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716, 22,718 (1987) (listing in
Question & Answer 2 sanctions added to Title I of ERISA by COBRA and enforced by the
Department of Labor).
77. H.R. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 562-63 (noting that the only sanction imposed on
covered state and local governments under COBRA amendments to the Public Health Services





and income provisions.8 The responsibility placed on the IRS is
particularly relevant here.
A year after COBRA was passed, the IRS issued the first pro-
posed explanatory regulations to COBRA.82 The proposed regula-
tions were issued without a definition of gross misconduct and with-
out any substantive guidance for arriving at one.83 According to
these regulations, except for situations involving gross misconduct,
the facts surrounding an employee's termination are irrelevant. 84 It
does not matter whether the covered employee's termination or re-
duction in hours was voluntary or involuntary.85 For example, re-
gardless of whether a covered employee's job termination is based
on a strike or walk-out, a lay-off or discharge, the employee will
generally be eligible for COBRA coverage. Surrounding circum-
stances are relevant only in a termination situation allegedly based
on gross misconduct.88 The proposed regulations state only that em-
ployers subject to COBRA should "operate in good faith compliance
with a reasonable interpretation of the statutory requirements."87 As
a result, employers are left to their own understanding of good faith
and their own interpretation of gross misconduct.
Since the enactment of COBRA and the issuance of the proposed
regulations, a number of laws have been passed amending COBRA.
None, however, has defined or provided guidance for defining gross
misconduct.88 Therefore, employers must look elsewhere to deter-
81. Id.
82. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987) (providing guidance, in Question & Answer form, on certain
changes made to ERISA by COBRA 1986 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 22,725.
85. Id. (responding to the question of voluntary terminations in Question & Answer 19).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 22,716.
88. Five major acts have been passed which include provisions amending COBRA. The Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 extended continuation coverage rights to retirees covered
by the employer plan at the time an employer enters bankruptcy. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 2075. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 then amended
election rights, notification requirements, and treatment of secondary qualifying events. Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2936. The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988 replaced the tax deduction denial sanction with an excise tax and clarified which
parties (i.e., both employers and insurance companies) are liable for payment of COBRA sanc-
tions. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3616.
Next, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 created an exception allowing continued
coverage of preexisting conditions under the former employer's plan where a subsequent group
health plan will not cover the preexisting condition. It also extended coverage to 29 months for
certain Medicare disabled employee beneficiaries. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2294. Finally, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
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mine what Congress intended and how best to apply the gross mis-
conduct provision.
D. Interpretations of COBRA's Gross Misconduct Provision
Although few and far between, there have been some attempts, by
experts and even by courts, to interpret COBRA's gross misconduct
provision. These attempts have resulted in a variety of definitions,
which differ greatly in their strictness.
1. Early Interpretations
The initial interpretations of what Congress intended by gross
misconduct varied.89 At one end of the spectrum, the ERISA Indus-
try Committee (ERIC) suggested, shortly after COBRA's enact-
ment, that state unemployment insurance policy be followed. ERIC
argued that when employees leave their employment voluntarily,
employers should not be required to provide continued health cover-
age." ERIC also suggested that disqualification for COBRA bene-
fits be based on misconduct, not gross misconduct.9 ERIC's con-
cern was that "plan administrators would be required to make
distinctions that would result in the extension of coverage where it is
improper to do So.'92
At the other end of the spectrum were those commentators who
argued that, according to "legislative aides and others close to the
legislation," Congress intended gross misconduct to mean "almost
criminal" conduct.9 3 These proponents of COBRA supported requir-
ing employers to show a very high level of gross misconduct when
denying an employee COBRA coverage. Also in this camp was the
Pension Counsel for the House Education and Labor Subcommittee,
who stated that although gross misconduct is not defined, Congress
intended the provision to "rarely" be applied. 94 Since these early
modified the small employer exception and made allowances for Medicaid to pay COBRA premi-
ums in certain situations. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388-161.
89. See COBRA Seminar, supra note 13, at 1305.




94. Employers Should Make "Good Faith" Effort to Comply with New Health Benefits Law,
Experts Say, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at CC-I (June 30, 1986) (referring to statements
by Phyllis C. Borzi, Pension Counsel for the House Education and Labor Subcommittee).
1992] 475
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
comments, no particular view has been verified or denied. The re-
sulting case law also provides only limited interpretive value.
2. COBRA Case Law Defining "Gross Misconduct"
There are few reported cases specifically addressing the issue of
whether an employer's denial of COBRA coverage to a covered em-
ployee was based on a termination for gross misconduct. Those cases
that do address the issue provide limited guidance.
In 1989, the Department of Labor pursued its first case on this
issue.95 In Dole v. Dayton-Hudson,96 the DOL charged Dayton-
Hudson and its subsidiary, Lechmere, with violating COBRA by
improperly denying continued health coverage to otherwise qualified
beneficiaries.97 Lechmere, a retail household appliance store, argued
that the employees were terminated for gross misconduct and there-
fore were ineligible for COBRA coverage. The employees were fired
for the unauthorized sale of merchandise service contracts. Accord-
ing to the DOL, this did not constitute gross misconduct.98 The case,
however, was settled after the DOL advised the employer that it
intended to look to Massachusetts unemployment insurance laws to
define gross misconduct.9 9 Therefore, no specific guidance was
provided.
The same approach for defining gross misconduct was recently
endorsed twice by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California in Paris v. F. Korbel & Bros.1"' and in Adkins
v. United International Investigative Services, Inc.1"'
In Paris, the plaintiff-employee was promoted to "hospitality as-
sistant," which entailed giving tours of her employer's winery and
waitressing at the poolhouse where executives and their guests
95. Dole v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., No. 89-1901-Z (D. Mass. filed Aug. 31, 1989). The Re-
gional Solicitor for the Department of Labor in the First Circuit stated that his office looked to
Massachusetts unemployment security law for some guidance in defining gross misconduct for
COBRA purposes. Interview with Michael Felsen, Regional Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor,
Ist Circuit, Boston, Massachusetts (Aug. 27, 1991).
96. No. 89-1901-Z (D. Mass. filed Aug. 31, 1989).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Interview with Felsen, supra note 95. For a discussion of how Massachusetts defines and
interprets misconduct for purposes of unemployment insurance disqualification, see infra notes
175-90 and accompanying text.
100. 751 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
101. No. C91-0087BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4719 (N.D. Cal. March 30, 1992).
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dined.1"2 The employer advised the plaintiff that anything she over-
heard in her new position was confidential and that if she breached
this confidence she would be terminated. 108 In the course of per-
forming her job, the plaintiff overheard some executives discussing
another employee, a pilot for the defendant's private fleet of air-
planes.104 They were discussing allowing him to become a part-time
employee "to ease some personal family stress."'1 5 The plaintiff was
a friend of the pilot and relayed this information to the pilot's wife,
who then told her husband. 06 Upon learning that his personal
problems were being discussed poolside, the pilot confronted his su-
pervisor about the breach of confidence.0 7 An investigation ensued,
and the plaintiff was terminated for divulging what she had over-
heard.10 8 The employer did not offer the plaintiff continued health
coverage. 09
The plaintiff sued her employer after learning about COBRA cov-
erage while later seeking medical attention for her son." 0 The em-
ployer argued that the plaintiff was ineligible for COBRA because
her breach of confidentiality constituted gross misconduct in that it
caused the pilot to become angry, thereby risking the safety of exec-
utives who flew with the pilot."' The plaintiff suggested the court
not rely on the employer's interpretation of gross misconduct, but
that it look instead to the definition of misconduct under state un-
employment insurance law." 2 Under California unemployment in-
surance law, "conduct evincing such willful and wanton disregard of
an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disre-
gard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to
expect of his employee" constitutes misconduct.1 13 Good faith errors
in judgment or discretion do not constitute misconduct." 4
The Paris court pointed out that neither the statute nor any regu-
102. Paris, 751 F. Supp. at 835.
103. Id.






110. Id. at 836-37.
111. Id. at 836.
112. Id. at 838.
113. Id. (quoting Amador v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 677 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1984)).
114. Id. at 838-39.
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lations defined gross misconduct under COBRA and that the legis-
lative history and proposed rules merely require employers to apply
the law in good faith and within a reasonable interpretation of the
substantive rules. 115 The court then accepted the plaintiff's sugges-
tion, concluding that state unemployment case law "sheds more
light on possible meanings than do [defendant's] protestations of
good faith.""' 6 Although the plaintiff may have acted with poor
judgment, the court concluded that her actions did not amount to
gross misconduct." 7
More recently, in Adkins v. United International Investigative
Services, Inc.," 8 the plaintiff was originally a security guard for
Burns Security Service, which had a contract for services with two
armories. 1 9 Burns discovered that the plaintiff had left his post and
was sleeping at home. The plaintiff also had falsified the daily log
by adding the name of an employee who did not exist in order to
collect a second paycheck.' 20 Burns told the plaintiff he could either
seek other employment or have these incidents reported in his per-
sonnel file. 2 ' The plaintiff opted for neither and went to work for a
second armory that Burns serviced.' 2 He did this knowing that this
armory had a contract with Burns which prohibited the transfer of
guards terminated for misconduct.'23 Burns's security service con-
tracts with the armories were later taken over by United Interna-
tional Investigative Services, the defendant, who continued to em-
ploy the plaintiff. 2 However, upon learning of the plaintiff's
previous acts of misconduct, the defendant terminated him, as pro-
vided for under the service contracts. 25
The plaintiff elected COBRA coverage and, shortly after his ter-
115. Id. at 838. This limited guidance requires employers to "operate in good faith compliance
with a reasonable interpretation of the statutory requirements" and proposed regulations issued
June 15, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987).
116. Paris, 751 F. Supp. at 838.
117. Id. at 839. The court does not discuss the fact that the state unemployment insurance law
refers to misconduct and COBRA refers to gross misconduct. This may be because here the court
found the employee's conduct was not bad enough to meet even the misconduct requirement.
118. No. C91-0087BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4719 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 1992).
119. Id. at *1-2.
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id. at *1-2.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id.
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mination, underwent heart surgery.'2 6 Pursuant to his election for
COBRA coverage, the plaintiff sent his insurance premiums to the
defendant who sent them on to Burns's insurance carrier. The insur-
ance carrier refused coverage. 27 The plaintiff responded by filing a
claim alleging a violation of COBRA, and thus ERISA.128 The de-
fendant argued, among other things, that the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to COBRA coverage because he was terminated for gross mis-
conduct. 29 Using the rationale of Paris, this court agreed with the
defendant. 30 Looking at the specific acts of alleged misconduct, the
court concluded that the plaintiff's desertion of his post constituted
a "substantial disregard" of the defendant's interest and that his
falsification of the daily log was "gross misconduct under even the
most lenient standards."' 3' The plaintiff's transfer, in knowing viola-
tion of Burns's contract with the armory, also was found to consti-
tute gross misconduct. 32 Thus, in Adkins, the court used the state
unemployment law definition to support an employer's decision not
to extend coverage.
Not all courts confronted with this issue have relied on state un-
employment laws for defining gross misconduct. In Avina v. Texas
Pig Stands, Inc.,' 33 the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas found that an employee's termination was
based on gross misconduct. 34 The court arrived at this conclusion
without relying on language in state unemployment insurance
law.'36 In Avina, the employee was a district manager in the em-
ployer's San Antonio office, a position which "required a high de-
gree of trust and confidence."' ' 6 After the employer and employee
"agreed" that the employee would be terminated, the employee sent
his COBRA application to the insurer; however, he was denied con-
tinued coverage when the application arrived late.37 In a subse-
quent suit against the employer, the employee alleged a COBRA
126. Id.
127. Id. at *4.
128. Id. at *4-5.
129. Id. at *5.
130. Id. at *11 (citing Paris v. F. Korbel & Bros., 751 F.Supp. 834, 838 (N.D. Cal. 1990)).
131. Id. at *11-12.
132. Id. at *12.
133. No. SA-88-CA-13, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13957 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1991).
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. at *4-5.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *3.
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violation, grounded in the employer's untimely COBRA notifica-
tion."3 8 The court did not rule on the notification violation but con-
cluded that because the employee's termination was based on gross
misconduct, the employer was not even required to offer him cover-
age.'3 9 Without discussing the facts surrounding the termination,
the court held that gross misconduct by a managerial employee is
defined as the "substantial deviation from the high standards and
obligations of a managerial employee that would indicate that said
employee cannot be entrusted with his management duties without
danger to the employer."' 40 Instead of relying on state unemploy-
ment insurance law, the court apparently accepted the employer's
definition as satisfying COBRA's good faith application require-
ment. In effect, the court required a lesser degree of misconduct for
managerial employees.
The early interpretations of what Congress intended gross miscon-
duct to mean along with the case law to date offer only limited as-
sistance to employers attempting to utilize this provision. No uni-
formity has resulted, nor is there a consensus concerning the best
definition. Possible definitions range from a lesser degree of miscon-
duct for managers to the various state unemployment insurance mis-
conduct standards to a stricter criminal standard. The three em-
ployer options mentioned earlier offer additional insight and are
discussed next.
E. Options for Defining Gross Misconduct
There are several potential approaches for arriving at a useful
definition of gross misconduct. The three options discussed here are:
1) using a dictionary definition, 2) using the definitions of similar
terms in analogous areas of law, and 3) seeking an amendment to
COBRA by Congress and/or the issuance of explanatory regula-
tions from the IRS.
1. Option One - The Dictionary Definition
One option for employers is to consistently rely on a single dic-
tionary definition. For example, an employer might look to Black's
Law Dictionary which defines "gross" as "beyond allowance, fla-
138. Id.
139. Id. at *4-5.
140. Id. at *5.
480 [Vol. 42:463
COBRA - GROSS MISCONDUCT
grant or shameful. 14 1 Further, it defines "misconduct" as a "trans-
gression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
or improper or wrong behavior, but not negligence or careless-
ness."'" Therefore, an act of gross misconduct might be defined as
anything from "flagrant, unlawful behavior" to a "shameful trans-
gression of some established and definite rule," two very different
definitions.
The dictionary approach may offer ease of administration; how-
ever, because of the varying terms it provides for defining both
"gross" and "misconduct," it does not promote consistency within a
particular employer or among different employers. Nor has this op-
tion been specifically endorsed by a primary authority as satisfying
the good faith compliance requirement.
2. Option Two - Similar Terms in Analogous Laws
The second option, looking to the definition and interpretation of
similar terms in analogous areas of law, offers a useful alternative
because the groundwork has already been laid by existing case law.
Two areas of law, state unemployment health insurance law and
federal employee health benefits law, are analogous to COBRA and
thus provide insight for drafters of a COBRA gross misconduct
definition.
a. State unemployment insurance law
The respective roles of COBRA and state unemployment insur-
ance laws are parallel in many ways. COBRA provides for contin-
ued health benefit coverage during a period when coverage would
otherwise cease due to, among other events, employment termina-
tion. Similarly, state unemployment insurance provides continued
income benefits during a period of unemployment. There are, how-
ever, as many differences as there are similarities.
One major difference is that state unemployment insurance is in-
tended to protect and cushion workers and their families when em-
ployees become unemployed through no fault of their own.' 4" These
141. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (6th ed. 1990).
142. Id. at 999.
143. Nichols v. Department of Employment Sec., 578 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (11I. App. 1991)
(stating the purpose of the law and citing Siler v. Department of Employment Sec., 549 N.E.2d
760 (1989)). See, e.g., Garland v. Department of Labor, 472 N.E.2d 434 (Ill. 1984) (holding that
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laws are generally construed liberally to effectuate the legislative
policy of protecting employees against the severe economic conse-
quences that may result from involuntary unemployment. 14 4 CO-
BRA, on the other hand, provides continued health coverage to a
much broader group of covered employees and qualified benefi-
ciaries.146 Both voluntarily terminated and most involuntarily termi-
nated employees and their qualified beneficiaries qualify for CO-
BRA coverage.
Like COBRA's gross misconduct provision, state unemployment
laws also provide for certain situations in which an employee may
unemployment insurance law is a benefit for employees who become unemployed involuntarily);
Grobe v. Board of Review, 101 N.E.2d 95 (I11. 1951) (holding that two weeks of paid vacation
taken by union employees when the employer shuts down the department in which employees
work does not amount to involuntary unemployment for benefit purposes); Dohoney v. Director of
Div. of Employment Sec., 386 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1979) (rejecting a female employee's suggestion
that maternity leave be established as involuntary per se for unemployment insurance purposes).
See also CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) ("An individual is disquali-
fied for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he or she left his or her
most recent work voluntarily without good cause or that he or she has been discharged for miscon-
duct connected with his or her most recent work."); Cusack v. Director of Div. of Employment
Sec., 378 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Mass. 1978) ("It is well settled that the purpose of the [unemploy-
ment insurance law] is 'to afford benefits to persons who are out of work and unable to secure
work through no fault of their own.' " (citations omitted)); In re Ferrara, 176 N.E.2d 43, 46-47
(N.Y. 1961) (stating that the purpose of the unemployment insurance law is to protect wage
earners from the hazards of unemployment through no fault of their own). But see Raytheon Co.
v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 307 N.E.2d 330, 332-33 (Mass. 1974) (arguing that the
broader purpose of the law, to provide temporary relief to employees compelled to leave work
through no fault of their own, includes a night-shift employee who loses her transportation to work
and, because there are no day shift openings, leaves her job).
144. See, e.g., Lipman v. Board of Review, 462 N.E.2d 798, 800 (111. App. Ct. 1984) ("The
Unemployment Compensation Act . . . is to be liberally construed in order to effectuate the legis-
lature's public policy . . . of protecting against the severe economic consequences resulting from
involuntary unemployment."). See also Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Dev., 521 P.2d
110, 118 (Cal. 1974) ("The provisions of the Unemployment Insurance Code must be liberally
construed to further the legislative objectives."); Mangan v. Bernardi, 477 N.E.2d 13, 16 (II1.
App. Ct. 1985) (holding that a laid-off employee's refusal of a position under which he would no
longer be eligible for health and other fringe benefits was based on good cause, was not a volun-
tary termination, and therefore, did not disqualify him for unemployment insurance benefits under
a liberal construction of the law); General Elec. Co. v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 207
N.E.2d 289, 291 (Mass. 1965) (interpreting the law to require a liberal construction in support of
its goal of alleviating the burden on unemployed workers and their families); In re Krieger, 107
N.Y.S.2d 916, 918 (N.Y. 1951) (holding that the law is to be construed reasonably, not as a
guarantee of unemployment benefits but as an emergency measure). But see Redlich v. Corsi, 88
N.Y.S.2d 868, 871 (N.Y. 1949) (holding that unemployment insurance law does not purport "to
confer benefits on every person out of employment," and is "not intended to apply to casual or
intermittent workers").
145. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (outlining the definitions of covered em-
ployee and qualified beneficiary).
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not qualify for unemployment insurance benefits.14 6 Although the
language and application of these state laws vary, common reasons
for benefit disqualification include: 1) voluntary separation or termi-
nation;14 7 2) discharge for misconduct, including absences, fighting,
insubordination, job application misrepresentation, refusal to follow
work orders, and theft;148 3) refusal of suitable work, 19 and 4) un-
employment due to labor disputes.'50 Disqualification for unemploy-
ment benefits due to employee misconduct is closely related to CO-
BRA's gross misconduct exception.
While COBRA refers specifically to gross misconduct, state em-
ployment insurance statutes do not uniformly use this term. Rather,
it is more common for a statute to refer to misconduct and then to
define the degree of misconduct necessary to disqualify an employee
for unemployment insurance purposes.' 5' Most states define disqual-
ifying misconduct as "willful,"' 52 "deliberate misconduct in wilful
disregard of the employing unit's interest,"'' 15  or the "failure to obey
orders, rules or instructions or the failure to discharge the duties for
which [the employee] was employed.' 54 It is not at all clear that
146. 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1970, at 4451-54.
147. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS 4-4 (1992).
148. Id. See also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593, ch. 312, art. 18 (McKinney 1991).
149. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., supra note 147, at 4-4.
150. Id.
151. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1970, at 4451-53. Note that the definition of misconduct
stated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. 636 (Wis.
1941) is followed by many jurisdictions and administrative agencies. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) $ 1970, at 4451-4. The Boynton court gave the following definition of misconduct:
[Tihe term "misconduct" . . . is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton
disregard of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of
standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or
in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpa-
bility, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disre-
gard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and obligations to his
employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good
performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negli-
gence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be
deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.
Boynton. 296 N.W. at 640.
152. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236 (1990); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802 (1990).
153. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 151A, § 25 (1992); see also Newton v. Department of Em-
ployment Sec., 409 A.2d 594, 595 (Vt. 1979) (holding that an employee of the Department of
Social Welfare, who knowingly failed to report his wife's return to work and continued to receive
food stamps, did so in disregard of his employer's interest and was guilty of gross misconduct
resulting in extended benefit disqualification).
154. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., supra note 147, at 4-8
(citing Georgia law). Under Texas law, misconduct includes conduct which "places others in dan-
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these definitions are applied similarly.
In Illinois, for example, disqualifying misconduct is defined as:
(Tihe deliberate and willful violation of a reasonable rule or policy of the
employing unit, governing the individual's behavior in performance of his
work, provided such violation has harmed the employing unit or other em-
ployees or has been repeated by the individual despite a warning or other
explicit instruction from the employing unit.185
In applying this definition, an Illinois court held, in Winklmeier v.
Board of Review,' 51 that an employee terminated for submitting
thirteen false medical claims on behalf of his wife was properly de-
nied unemployment insurance. 157 The court decided that the em-
ployee's actions demonstrated a willful disregard of the employer's
interest and of the standard of behavior expected of an employee.158
In Gee v. Board of Review,"6 9 the court found that arguing with an
employer or supervisor without the use of abusive language or
threats did not constitute misconduct for purposes of unemployment
benefit disqualification. 60 However, it explained that the use of abu-
sive language would constitute insubordination and may constitute
ger or an intentional violation of an employer policy or law, but does not include" responses to
unconscionable employer provocation. Id. (citing Texas law). Despite variations among the states,
generally accepted principles of unemployment insurance disqualification indicate that the con-
duct: 1) need not violate a law or moral code; 2) may be a civil or industrial offense; 3) is gener-
ally connected with work; and 4) results in discharge of employee. I B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
1970, at 4451-4. The employer has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence of the
act. Id.
155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 11 432 (1991). See, e.g., Adams v. Ward, 565 N.E.2d 53 (111. App.
Ct. 1990) (holding that an employer failed to show that it suffered actual harm because it had
failed to establish that the employee's discharge was for misconduct); Siler v. Department of Em-
ployment Sec., 549 N.E.2d 760 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that a building maintenance engi-
neer, by merely failing to follow correct procedures or disregarding an employer's requirements
for safety and sanitation, did not engage in misconduct because the actions amounted only to
carelessness or negligence, not willful or wanton disregard for the employer's interest); Crowley v.
Department of Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 546 N.E.2d 1042 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (stating
that good faith errors in judgment do not constitute misconduct). But see Granite City Steel Div.
of Nat'l Steel Corp. v. Board of Review, 385 N.E.2d 931 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that
ineligibility is not limited to intentional wrongdoing, but that each case should be determined in
accordance with the facts).
156. 450 N.E.2d 353 (I11. App. Ct. 1983).
157. Id. at 353. The court stated further that the employee's misconduct need not have a direct
connection with the work being performed, as long as it is contrary to the employer's interest. Id.
at 355.
158. Id. at 354.
159. 483 N.E.2d 1025 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
160. Id. at 1025. See also Sheff v. Board of Review, 470 N.E.2d 1044 (I11. App. Ct. 1984)
(concluding that an employee who raised his voice at his employer behind closed doors, and with-
out the use of abusive language, was not guilty of misconduct).
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disqualifying misconduct.1"' Other disqualifying misconduct in Illi-
nois includes the use of marijuana at work or evidence that an em-
ployee is under the influence of marijuana during work in violation
of an employer's rules,6 2 and conviction of a felony in connection
with or impacting the individual's employment. 6
California courts similarly refer to willful misconduct, but they
define it as "volitional," meaning "wilful, wanton or equally culpa-
ble."' 64 In Jacobs v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,65 a
California court held that an employee who had worked for an em-
ployer for twelve years could not be denied unemployment benefits
based on his discharge for chronic absenteeism due to alcoholism. 66
The court held that it was first necessary to determine whether the
employee had the capacity to abstain from drinking. 16 7 If not, the
employee could not have acted willfully or wantonly. 6 8
In addition to being willful, in California disqualifying miscon-
duct must also generally be in disregard of the employer's inter-
est. '9 In Rowe v. Hansen,7 ' a hostess-cashier in a restaurant was
161. Carroll v. Board of Review, 477 N.E.2d 800, 805 (I11. App. Ct. 1985).
162. Profice v. Board of Review, 481 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (I11. App. Ct. 1985) (stating that
evidence of marijuana in the employee's system, the strong odor of marijuana, and the fact that a
co-worker whom the employee was with was found with the drug in her purse, was sufficient to
prove the misconduct); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that an
employment dismissal because of the religious use of sacramental peyote was misconduct disquali-
fying the employee from unemployment benefits).
163. John F. Decker, Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction in Illinois, 56 Cm.-
KENT L. REV. 731, 750-51 (1980) (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 4'32c (1977) and discussing the
many collateral consequences which may follow a felony conviction in Illinois, including disqualifi-
cation for state unemployment insurance benefits).
164. Jacobs v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 102 Cal. Rptr. 364, 366 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972) (holding that where a twelve-year employee was discharged for chronic absenteeism
due to chronic intoxication, a determination should be made whether the employee did not have
the capacity to abstain from drinking and therefore, could not be found to have acted willfully or
wantonly); see also Morris v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 110 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973) (finding that threatening bodily harm to supervisors is misconduct for purposes of unem-
ployment insurance law); but see Moore v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 215 Cal. Rptr. 316
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an employee's conduct will not be found to be disqualifying
willful misconduct where he has good cause for his actions); Amador v, Unemployment Ins. Ap-
peals Bd., 200 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an employee's repeated and
willful refusal to obey a reasonable order by the employer, or insubordination, is not willful mis-
conduct if the employee establishes good cause).
165. 102 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
166. Id. at 367 (holding that there must be a finding made as to an employee's capacity to act
in order to determine willfulness).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Lacy v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 95 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (holding that an employee's failure to comply with an employer's order that, following a
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discharged for insubordination after refusing, in front of customers,
to comply with a requirement that sweaters be worn and not draped
over the shoulders.17 1 The California court found this conduct suffi-
cient to harm the employer's economic interests and, thus, to consti-
tute willful misconduct. 1 2 When the authority an employer gives an
employee to handle day-to-day operations is "flouted, the interests
of the employer suffer.'7 The court reasoned that the misconduct
need not constitute an "immediate and direct economic" harm to
the employer in order to harm its interests.' 7 4
Additional variations in the application of unemployment insur-
ance law can be found in Massachusetts statutory and case law.
There, the relevant statute requires that courts place added empha-
sis on the employee's state of mind. 5 In Smith v. Director of Divi-
sion of Employment Security,'17  an employer showed that an em-
ployee had this requisite state of mind where the employee, who was
aware of company rules prohibiting drinking of alcohol on the job,
nonetheless drank alcohol at work. 77
It may not always be necessary, however, for the employer in
Massachusetts to make a specific showing of the employee's state of
demotion, she train her successor-supervisor, was not done in disregard of the employer's interest
and did not disqualify her for unemployment insurance benefits where such an order imposed a
new and unreasonable burden on her).
170. 116 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
171. Id. at 18 (noting that the employee also refused to leave when she was asked).
172. Id. at 24 (holding that disqualifying misconduct need not result in immediate or direct
economic harm to an employer to constitute disregard for an employer's interest).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 15 1A, § 25 (1992) (stating that an employee's acts of misconduct must
be willful to be disqualifying). See Smith v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 429 N.E.2d
700, 702 (Mass. 1981) (holding that the critical issue in determining whether misconduct was
willful or intentional is the employee's state of mind); see also Johnson v. Director of Div. of
Employment Sec., 385 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 1979) (holding that an employee who was tardy three
days in his first two weeks of work, after being warned that tardiness would not be tolerated, acted
deliberately); Reavey v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 387 N.E.2d 581 (Mass. 1979)
(holding that where an employee was discharged because he deliberately drove a forklift truck
into a wall during work hours, his unemployment benefit disqualification could not be upheld
without a finding as to his state of mind); Kinch v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 506
N.E.2d 169 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that an employee's refusal to work in violation of a
prohibition against working seven consecutive work days did not constitute misconduct, regardless
of whether the employee was aware of the right not to work).
176. 429 N.E.2d 700 (Mass. 1981).
177. Id. at 700; but see Shepherd v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 506 N.E.2d 874
(Mass. 1987) (stating that an employee, discharged for excessive absences, who shows that he
suffered from alcoholism, may be able to establish that his discharge was not based solely on
deliberate misconduct).
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mind. Where the nature of an action itself indicates that the con-
duct is deliberate, it is not necessary to scrutinize as closely the em-
ployee's state of mind. 17  For example, in Sharon v. Director of Di-
vision of Employment Security,179 the court held that an employee
was properly denied unemployment insurance without an inquiry
into his state of mind where he called his employer a liar and other
derogatory names in front of several managers and then refused to
make a public apology. 80 According to the court, the employee's
refusal to apologize established the requisite intent.' 8'
It is also necessary under Massachusetts law to consider whether:
1) the employee's misconduct was in disregard of his employer's in-
terest;8 2 2) there were any mitigating circumstances;"8 3 or 3) the
employee was acting in good faith.8 4 In Wedgewood v. Director of
Division of Employment Security,8 ' the court held that although
sleeping on the job may establish a prima facie case of an em-
ployee's willful disregard for an employer's interest, it was necessary
to investigate any mitigating circumstances, such as a medical rea-
son for falling asleep at work."88 In Goodridge v. Director of Divi-
sion of Employment Security,8 7 an employee who was fired for
leaving work argued that he left work because of his good faith reli-
ance on the grievance procedures in the employee handbook.' As
in Wedgewood, the court determined that further investigation was
necessary."8 9 In particular, the lower court was directed to deter-
178. Sharon v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 455 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (Mass. 1983)
(quoting Garfield v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 384 N.E.2d 642 (Mass. 1979)).
179. Id. at 1214.
180. Id. at 1214-15.
181. Id. at 1215.
182. Wedgewood v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 514 N.E.2d 680 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987) (holding that although sleeping on the job in willful disregard of employer interest may
constitute misconduct, it is necessary to consider any mitigating circumstances as well); see also
Hawkins v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 465 N.E.2d 786 (Mass. 1984) (holding that an
employee's intentional disregard of his employer's reasonable requests to remove his radio head-
phones to hear instructions was contrary to the employer's interests, and the employee had not
relied in good faith on any employee handbook provision for radio listening because none existed).
183. Wedgewood, 514 N.E.2d at 680.
184. Goodridge v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 377 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1978) (holding
that an employee's good faith, not only the question of deliberate misconduct, must be considered
to determine the employee's state of mind).
185. 514 N.E.2d 680 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
186. Id. at 680.
187. 377 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 1987).
188. Id. at 928-30.
189. Id.
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mine whether the employee had acted in good faith. 190
Finally, in New York, the courts have chosen, for purposes of un-
employment disqualification, to distinguish between discharge for
cause and discharge for misconduct. 191 Conduct which may consti-
tute just cause for discharging an employee may not rise to the level
of misconduct justifying unemployment insurance disqualification. 92
For example, in James v. Levin,"9 3 an employee's refusal to work
overtime, which justified his discharge, was not misconduct justify-
ing his unemployment insurance denial.' In fact, in Hunt v. Gen-
eral Electric Co.,'9 5 an employee's conviction for "body stealing,"
although termed "bizarre," was only sufficient to justify his dis-
charge, not a denial of unemployment insurance. 9
In New York, conduct generally rises to the level of misconduct
for disqualification purposes if it is detrimental to the employer's
interest or is in violation of a reasonable work condition."9 7 Such
misconduct might include insubordination, misrepresentation, cer-
tain off-duty activities, refusal to follow orders, and a violation of
reasonable rules. 98 Specific examples of employee conduct deemed
disqualifying include: a counter worker who continuously reported
to work under the influence of alcohol;' 99 a hat-check person who,
after a motorcycle accident, failed to notify her employer when she
would return to work and also tried to set her own work schedule;200
and a social worker who, after handling a case unsatisfactorily, ig-
190. Id. at 930.
191. Hulse v. Levine, 361 N.E.2d 1034, 1035 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that an employee's refusal
to work overtime, although enough to constitute discharge for cause, does not necessarily amount
to misconduct for purposes of unemployment insurance denial).
192. Id.; see also In re James, 315 N.E.2d 471, 475 (N.Y. 1974) (stating that a "valid cause"
for discharge must rise to the level of misconduct before an employee becomes disqualified for
unemployment benefits).
193. 315 N.E.2d 471 (N.Y. 1974).
194. Id. at 473 (stating that inefficiency, negligence, and bad judgment are valid causes for
discharge but do not render an employee disqualified for unemployment benefits).
195. 444 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
196. Id. at 492-93 (holding that every discharge for cause does not amount to misconduct).
197. See In re Bruggeman, 477 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that selling
controlled substances during nonwork hours reflected adversely upon the employee's ability to hold
a position as town assessor, which required trust and confidence, and that such conduct rose to the
level of misconduct). See also In re Brewer, 384 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding
that theft by employees from the employer violated reasonable work conditions and, thus,
amounted to misconduct).
198. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593, ch. 312, art. 18 (McKinney 1991).
199. In re James, 315 N.E.2d 471, 474 (N.Y. 1974).
200. Id.
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nored her superior and avoided meeting with her director.2"' A con-
viction for a crime against the employer, or for a crime away from
work which adversely impacts the employer's interest, also consti-
tutes disqualifying misconduct in New York.20 2
Most state statutes require that the misconduct also be "con-
nected with work."203 However, these courts recognize that employ-
ees also have a duty to regard the employer's interest while away
from work. 04 For instance, in Dean v. South Dakota Department of
Labor,20 5 two charges of shoplifting away from work were sufficient
to constitute disqualifying misconduct for unemployment insurance
purposes.20 6 The court held that an employee's duty to consider the
employer's interests continues away from work.207
Another distinction between the disqualifying provisions of CO-
BRA and state unemployment insurance law is the resulting degree
of disqualification. Under COBRA, an employee who is terminated
for gross misconduct is completely disqualified, as are his or her
spouse and dependents. 0 8 For purposes of unemployment insurance,
however, the degree of the misconduct affects the period of unem-
ployment benefit disqualification.209 For instance, a disqualification
under unemployment insurance laws may result in: 1) postponement
of benefits for a prescribed period in addition to the waiting period
required of all claimants; 2) reduction in benefits; 3) cancellation of
benefit rights; or 4) some combination of the above.210 In most
201. Id.
202. In re Bruggeman, 477 N.Y.S.2d 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). The rationale for allowing
disqualification for nonwork misconduct is that an employee violates an implied condition of em-
ployment by committing an act involving "moral turpitude" even where the act did not occur
during work hours. Id.
203. 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1970, at 4451-54.
204. Id.; see also Dean v. South Dakota Dep't of Labor, 367 N.W.2d 779, 782 (S.D. 1985)
(finding that a clerk-typist's discharge, after her second charge of shoplifting away from work,
was sufficient to satisfy denial of unemployment benefits since an employee's duty to regard an
employer's interest continues away from work).
205. 367 N.W.2d 779 (S.D. 1985).
206. Id. at 782.
207. Id.
208. 29 U.S.C. §1163(2).
209. IB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1970, at 4451-53.
210. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN. UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., supra note 147, at 4-4.
Seven states provide for variable disqualification periods for discharge for misconduct with Ala-
bama on the low end (three to seven weeks), and South Carolina on the high end (five to twenty-
six weeks). Id. at 4-8. The other five states are: Florida, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, and
North Carolina. Id. at 4-37. Other states have fixed disqualification periods, disqualification for
the duration of unemployment or longer, reduced benefits, or cancellation of benefit rights. Id. at
4-8.
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states, misconduct involving a criminal act, a felony, a misde-
meanor, or gross misconduct warrants a more severe disqualifying
period."1 For example, under Minnesota law, if an employee's mis-
conduct does not amount to gross misconduct, the employee is dis-
qualified for unemployment benefits for a limited period.2 12 If in-
stead the employee is terminated for gross misconduct, he is totally
disqualified for an entire benefit year. 13
When determining the degree of misconduct and, thus, the sever-
ity of the benefit disqualification, there appears to be no uniform
rule as to the number of acts of misconduct that will justify disqual-
ification. 1 " Depending on the act, some courts might find one act of
misconduct sufficient.2 18 The Delaware Supreme Court held, in Un-
employment Insurance Appeal Board v. Martin,216 that two employ-
ees were not disqualified after single incidents of "failure to heed an
employer's instructions," not because additional acts were needed
for disqualification, but because the employer had tolerated "actions
of similar severity" in the past.217 The number of acts of misconduct
appears determinative where the conduct is such that it would not
normally result in disqualification (e.g., acts of carelessness, negli-
gence, inefficiency, and rule breaking).' For example, a Florida
court held that a bank teller who was terminated after negligently
211. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) T 1970, at 4451-53; see also Department of Economic &
Employment Dev. v. Owens, 541 A.2d 1324, 1327 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (holding that an
employee's threat to kill his supervisor after a grievance meeting constituted gross misconduct for
unemployment insurance benefit disqualification purposes).
212. MINN. STAT. § 268.09(1) (1986).
213. Id. § 268.09(1)(d). Gross misconduct is defined in Minnesota as involving "assault and
battery or the malicious destruction of property or arson or sabotage or embezzlement or any
other act, including theft, the commission of which amounts to a felony or gross misdemeanor."
Id. However, the law provides an exception to disqualification for misconduct (not for gross mis-
conduct) if the employee is separated from employment because of a chemical dependency. Id. §
268.09(1)(c).
214. lB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 111970, at 4451-55; see also Department of Economic &
Employment Dev. v. Jones, 558 A.2d 739 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (holding that an employee's
persistent absenteeism and drug use constituted gross misconduct where there was a series of
repeated violations of employment rules, proving the employee regularly and wantonly disregarded
his obligation to his employer); Bailey v. Rutledge, 327 S.E.2d 456, 458 (W. Va. 1985) (holding
that an employee's refusal to accept a single out-of-state trucking assignment for personal reasons
constituted misconduct, but not gross misconduct, and therefore triggers a shorter period of
disqualification).
215. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Del. 1981).
216. Id. at 1268.
217. Id. (quoting Boughton v. Division of Unemployment Ins., 300 A.2d 25, 27 (Del. 1972)).
218. See Terjesen v. State, 491 So.2d 1189, 1189-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
an employee was properly disqualified after mishandling bank funds several times).
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mishandling funds several times was properly disqualified for unem-
ployment benefits. 19
A few states do not require misconduct for unemployment insur-
ance disqualification. In these states, "just cause" is sufficient to
trigger disqualification.2 2 0 For example, under Utah law, an em-
ployee may be disqualified for unemployment benefits if terminated
for just cause, regardless of his willfulness or wantonness.2 2 1 Just
cause may be satisfied by establishing an employee's culpability,
knowledge of the consequences of his action, and control over his
action. 22
Although the results are varied, state case law offers useful in-
sight for employers trying to define gross misconduct, at least within
the context of a particular state.
b. Federal employee health benefit law
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Amendments Act of
1988 (FEHBAA) 223 provides a second area of analogous law. The
primary purposes of FEHBAA were to protect Federal Employees'
Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) participants from unfit health
care providers and to provide certain participants with continued
health coverage. 24 FEHBAA extends to federal employees essen-
tially the same right of continued health coverage given to private
sector employees and state and local government employees under
COBRA.225
Like COBRA, FEHBAA offers continued health coverage to ter-
minated employees, certain unmarried dependent children, and for-
mer spouses who would otherwise lose their coverage under the
FEHBP. 221 FEHBAA provides, as does COBRA, that employees
who are terminated for gross misconduct are not entitled to contin-
219. Id.
220. 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1970, at 4451-54 to 51-55. Such states include Colorado,
Ohio, and Utah. Id.
.221. Id. at 4451-4.
222. Id. Colorado, another just cause state, also provides no definition for just cause, but it does
provide a list of possible acts that would disqualify an employee for unemployment benefits. Id. at
4451-54 to 51-55 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-73-108(5) (West 1990)).
223. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1988).
224. H.R. REP. No. 917, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1988).
225. Id. at 7.
226. 5 U.S.C. § 8905a(b) (1988) (enunciating classes of people covered by the Federal Em-
ployee Continued Coverage Act).
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ued coverage.227 Unlike COBRA, Congress and the Office of Per-
sonnel Management 28 made a clear attempt to define gross miscon-
duct for purposes of FEHBAA. 2 9 This definition was included in
the regulations published the year following FEHBAA's
enactment.2"'
The regulations define gross misconduct as a "flagrant and ex-
treme transgression of law or established rule of action for which an
employee is separated and concerning which a judicial or adminis-
trative finding of gross misconduct has been made."2'' The regula-
tions explain that the definition was drawn from the understanding
of gross misconduct in the legal community, and that gross miscon-
duct includes felonies and, possibly, lesser criminal offenses.23 2 In
addition to the gravity of an offense, the determination of gross mis-
conduct involves consideration of: 1) the nexus between the offense
and the employee's job;233 2) the employee's ability to comprehend
the gravity of his actions; 234 and 3) whether the offense was affirma-
tive and willful, not just negligent.235 The regulations also provide
that certain individuals, such as judges, will be held to higher stan-
dards of conduct.236
Thus, FEHBAA offers additional insight for employers in search
of a good faith, uniform definition of gross misconduct.
227. Id. § 8905a(b)(l)(A).
228. Id. § 8905a(f) (stating that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is directed to
issue regulations); see also H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 224, at 2-10 (indicating the authority
of the OPM to issue regulations).
229. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890.1102 (1992) (defining gross








236. Id. Different definitions have been developed based on an employee's position. See, e.g.,
Avina v. Texas Pig Stands, Inc., No. SA-88-CA-13, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13957 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 1, 1991) (discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 133-40). Under corporate law,
gross misconduct might include "concepts of an officer's abuse of power, bad faith, willful abuse of
discretion, or positive fraud." John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), cert.
denied, Ill S. Ct. 53 (1990). In John, an officer of a nonprofit corporation who engaged in self-
dealing was guilty of gross misconduct. Id. at 802. Gross misconduct might also be found by
intentional wrongdoing or failure to act within the officer's duties to the corporation. Id. at 801.
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3. Option Three - COBRA Amendments or Explanatory
Regulations
The third option is for Congress to amend COBRA to include a
uniform statutory definition of gross misconduct and to pressure the
IRS to issue regulations providing substantive guidelines specifically
addressing gross misconduct. The need for a uniform definition and
for uniform application of ERISA, as amended by COBRA, finds
support both in the language of ERISA2 7 and in its interpretation
by the United States Supreme Court in FMC Corp. v. Holliday."8
Generally, state laws which "relate to" employee benefit plans are
preempted by ERISA. aa A state law relates to employee benefit
plans if it has a "connection with" or makes "reference to" such
plans.240 Thus the ERISA preemption clause provides that the sub-
ject of any state law which relates to an ERISA employee benefit
plan falls under exclusive federal concern. 241 An exception to this
rule is the "savings clause. 242 This clause returns to states the
power to enforce state laws which relate to employee benefits but
also regulate insurance.24 3 The savings clause applies to every "in-
surance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or invest-
ment company" that is "engaged in the business of insurance or
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies,
or investment companies.1 244 It does not, however, include self-in-
sured employee benefit plans or any trusts established under such
plans. 24 5 ERISA retains power over self-insured plans under an ex-
237. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); ERISA § 514(a) (stating the preemption provision).
238. 111 S. Ct. 403, 408 (1990) (holding that ERISA's preemption clause should be applied to
ensure that benefit plans are governed by a single set of regulations as opposed to various and
numerous state regulations).
239. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); ERISA § 514(a).
240. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (holding that New York's
Human Rights Law is preempted by ERISA).
241. FMC Corp., Ill S. Ct. at 407 (holding that the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law is preempted by ERISA in so far as the law precludes reimbursement to a
self-funded employer health plan from a claimant's tort recovery); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44-47 (1987) (holding that ERISA preempts a claimant's suit under state
common law for alleged improper handling of his claim for benefits under ERISA); Shaw, 463
U.S. at 91 (holding that ERISA preempts New York's Human Rights Law).
242. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A); ERISA, § 514(b)(2)(A); see FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 407;
see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 (1985).
243. FMC Corp., Ill S. Ct. at 407.
244. See 29 U.S.C. § I144(b)(2)(B); ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B).
245. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (b)(2)(B); ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B). See also Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 471 U.S. at 733-35.
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ception to the savings clause exception. This is known as the
"deemer clause.
246
A major purpose behind the preemption clause is best explained
in the resulting case law on the issue. In FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
the Supreme Court stated that the purpose behind the ERISA pre-
emption is to promote uniformity and circumvent the frustration of
employee benefit plan administrators administering ERISA plans
nationwide. 47 Where a "'patchwork scheme of regulation would in-
troduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation,' "2,8
the Court has applied ERISA's preemption clause "to ensure that
benefit plans will be governed by only a single set of regulations.
249
The Court stated that ERISA employee benefit plans should be gov-
erned by a single set of regulations.15' A uniform definition of gross
misconduct would help to ensure that ERISA is administered as the
Supreme Court says it should be.
Having detailed the three proposed options, and in light of the
Supreme Court's likely endorsement of uniformity, this Comment
next suggests why this option is the appropriate solution.
II. ANALYSIS
This Comment's position is that the best solution for employers is
the third option: Congress should amend COBRA by adding a uni-
form definition of gross misconduct or, at the very least, should re-
quire the IRS to issue substantive regulatory guidelines for deter-
mining what conduct constitutes gross misconduct.
Most employers are subject to COBRA. Essentially, only employ-
ers who do not offer group health benefits or who maintain a
workforce of fewer than twenty employees on a typical business day
are not subject to COBRA. 5' Employers subject to COBRA must
either comply or suffer the consequences.252 Without additional
guidance, an employer who incorrectly believes it is in compliance
246. 29 U.S.C. §I 144(b)(2)(A); ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A). See FMC Corp., Ill S. Ct. at 409.
247. FMC Corp., I ll S. Ct. at 408-09; see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1, 10 (1987) (holding that to require employee benefit plan providers to design their programs in
an "environment of differing state regulations" would complicate the administration of nationwide
plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits (citing Shaw v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S., 85, 105 n.25 (1983))).
248. FMC Corp., I II S. Ct. at 408 (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at I1).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 29 U.S.C. § 1161.
252. See supra notes 74-77.
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may suffer these negative consequences even if its belief was in good
faith.
COBRA is a comprehensive piece of legislation which places ex-
tensive administrative costs on most employers. These costs include
tracking and notifying qualified beneficiaries as well as the costs in-
volved in providing the continued health benefits. 5 Although quali-
fied beneficiaries may be required to pay 102% of the group rate, it
is unlikely that the extra 2 % is sufficient to cover these administra-
tive costs. 54 Further, the potential exists for adverse selection
against the plan.255 For example, qualified beneficiaries may elect
COBRA for the purpose of visiting all those doctors they were
meaning to see before the qualifying event but did not get around to
seeing. Such a qualified beneficiary could stock up large insurance
bills during the period of COBRA coverage, realizing the coverage
is limited and alternative coverage may not be available.
Once subject to COBRA, there are few provisions that allow the
employer to deny continued health coverage. On its face, the gross
misconduct provision appears to give employers some discretion to
limit coverage. In practice, in light of the fact that gross misconduct
remains undefined, it is not clear how much discretion, if any, an
employer really possesses. Without a statutory definition or explana-
tory regulations, a decision to utilize this provision presents a poten-
tially costly risk to employers. If an employee or the Department of
Labor successfully challenges the employer's definition of gross mis-
conduct, retroactive coverage to wrongly denied beneficiaries and
noncompliance sanctions may be imposed upon the employer.2 6
Employers can find little comfort in the fact that they are re-
quired to merely operate in good faith compliance with a reasonable
interpretation of the statutory requirements and regulations. 7 As
the employers in Dayton-Hudson25 8 and Paris259 discovered, an at-
253. Robert M. Howard, The Terminated Employee's Right to Continue Group Health Insur-
ance, 17 COLO. LAW. 53, 54-55 (1988).
254. Id. at 54.
255. Adverse selection is defined as the "tendency of an individual to recognize his or her
health status in selecting the option under a retirement system or insurance plan that tends to be
most favorable to him or her (and more costly to the plan)." EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS: A GLOS-
SARY OF TERMS (June M. Lehman ed., 6th ed. 1990).
256. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing possible sanctions for
noncompliance).
257. H.R. REP. No. 241, supra note 14, at 4-7.
258. Dole v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., No. 89-1901-Z (D. Mass. filed Aug. 31, 1989).
259. Paris v. F. Korbel & Bros., 751 F.Supp. 834, 838-39 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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tempt at a good faith, reasonable interpretation of gross misconduct
may not be sufficient.
Congress's initial failure to provide guidance may be rationalized
bythe fact that the original legislation behind COBRA was not in-
tended to provide coverage to voluntarily or involuntarily terminated
employees.26 Coverage of terminated employees was introduced late
in the process, unaccompanied by any explanation. 6' The replace-
ment of the terminated "for cause" provision with the terminated
for "gross misconduct" provision also took place without discussion
or explanation.2 62  Nonetheless, since COBRA's introduction in
1985, and its enactment in 1986, Congress has had ample opportu-
nity to fill this void by including guidance in any of the several post-
1985 COBRA amendments.263 Without specific documented legisla-
tive history, it is difficult to know for sure what Congress in-
tended.264 Unfortunately for employers, regardless of whether Con-
gress thought about its meaning or impact, the term "gross
misconduct" was included in the bill and was enacted into law. CO-
BRA became effective generally for plan years beginning on or after
July 16, 1986. Guidance is long overdue.
It is common for a law to state a rule and provide little or no
implementation guidance. In such cases, the parties subject to the
law generally must rely on judicial interpretation of the law. How-
ever, because the case law is so limited in this specific area, an em-
ployer trying to apply the gross misconduct provision may need to
turn to other options for interpreting its meaning. A discussion of
the appropriateness of these options follows, moving away from reli-
ance on an employer-selected good faith definition, toward a single,
uniform definition.
A. Employer-by-Employer Definitions
The first option, relying on dictionary definitions of gross and mis-
260. H.R. 21, supra note 19; S. 1632, supra note 19. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying
text (discussing the original bills which introduced continued employer-provided health care to
certain spouses and dependent children of covered employees).
261. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing how the proposal that termi-
nated "for cause" employees not qualify for benefits was later replaced by the requirement that
they be terminated for gross misconduct).
262. HR. REP. No. 453, supra note 8, at 564-65.
263. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing five acts passed since enactment of
COBRA amending various provisions of COBRA).
264. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 154-62
(1975).
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conduct, can be dismissed quickly. Common sense tells us that if
applied consistently, this approach should satisfy the good faith in-
terpretation requirement. In fact, this appears to have been the ap-
proach taken in Avina v. Texas Pig Stands, Inc.,26 5 where the court
defined gross misconduct for managerial employees as the "substan-
tial deviation from the high standards and obligations of a manage-
rial employee that would indicate that said employee cannot be en-
trusted with his management duties without danger to the
employer. 266 Similarly, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) stated in its regulations to FEHBAA that the definition
drafted for gross misconduct was drawn from the meaning the term
has in the legal community. 67. However, it is one thing for a federal
office to rely on a dictionary definition or common usage to arrive at
a uniform definition all public employers must follow; it is another
for affected employers to do the same, thereby arriving attheir own,
separate definitions. The IRS should provide guidance for employers
affected by COBRA as the OPM did for federal employers affected
by FEHBAA.
Relying on dictionary definitions is more appropriate for a legisla-
tor drafting a statutory definition than it is for individual employers.
The dictionary, though helpful, is not a primary source of authority
on which employers may rely, as are statutes and regulations
drafted or authorized by Congress. Further, this approach does not
offer any real guidance since employers would still need to deter-
mine which conduct Congress intended to constitute gross
misconduct.
B. State-by-State Definitions
The second option, looking to analogous areas of law to arrive at
a good faith interpretation of gross misconduct, was the approach
suggested by Dayton-Hudson Corp.,268 and endorsed in California
in Paris"69 and Adkins.2 70 The conclusion of the Paris court, that
looking to state unemployment insurance laws is a better approach
than relying on an employer's good faith interpretation,2 71 also sup-
265. No. SA-88-CA-13, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13957 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1991).
266. Id. at *5.
267. 54 Fed. Reg. 52,333, 52,533 (1989).
268. No. 89-1901-Z (D.Mass. filed Aug. 31, 1989).
269. 751 F. Supp. at 834, 838 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
270. No. C91-0087BAC, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4719, at *11 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
271. Paris, 751 F. Supp. at 838.
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ports the use of a uniform definition, at least within the state. The
Paris court presented a convincing argument for relying on state
unemployment insurance law, focusing on the undeniably parallel
purposes behind providing unemployment income and providing con-
tinued health benefits.2 7 2 Both serve to protect an employee during a
period of unemployment - COBRA as to continued health cover-
age and state unemployment insurance as to continued income. The
rationale for relying on unemployment insurance law exists, but it is
not free of problems.
As the discussion on state unemployment insurance laws demon-
strates, 73 states do not agree on what acts constitute misconduct or
gross misconduct justifying unemployment insurance disqualifica-
tion. Most states require some degree of misconduct, 274 but some
only require just cause.275 Even the definitions that appear facially
similar may be applied differently. Among the states requiring the
higher standard of willful or deliberate misconduct, differing de-
grees of severity may be required. Usually, but not always, conduct
must be harmful to the employer's interest, connected to the em-
ployee's job, or both.276 While one act of misconduct may be suffi-
cient for benefit disqualification in some states, it may be insufficient
in others.2 " The states also differ as to the required amount of in-
vestigation into the conduct (e.g., as to an employee's state of mind,
any mitigating considerations, or good faith on the part of the em-
ployee), 78 the amount of harm to an employer's interest, and the
relation of outside actions to the workplace. Some states require
that the severity of the act be tantamount to a criminal offense,279
while others merely require a violation of a reasonable work rule
which directly or indirectly harms an employer's interest.2 80 For in-
272. Id.
273. See supra notes 143-225 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (noting that Colorado, Ohio, and Utah require
only just cause for disqualification).
276. See supra notes 169-74, 197-207 and accompanying text (discussing that some states re-
quire that the misconduct be harmful to the employer's interest and/or that it be connected with
work).
277. See supra notes 214-22 and accompanying text (discussing how in some states one act of
misconduct may be adequate while in others inadequate).
278. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text (discussing additional considerations
courts evaluate in determining disqualification).
279. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (discussing New York's unemployment
[Vol. 42:463
COBRA - GROSS MISCONDUCT
stance, recall the hostess-cashier in Rowe v. Hansen whose refusal
(in front of customers) to wear a sweater was determined to consti-
tute sufficient harm to the employer's interest to disqualify her for
unemployment insurance.281 If the same case arose in New York,
the court would likely have found this action sufficient cause for dis-
charge, but insufficient to justify disqualification for employment in-
surance benefits.282
Therefore, a major problem in relying on state unemployment in-
surance law is the inherent inconsistency among states. Employees
residing in different states, terminated for the same reasons, will be
treated differently. Employees of the same nationwide employer, ter-
minated for essentially the same reason, may or may not receive
unemployment insurance, again, depending on the state in which
they were employed. This problem provides one of the strongest ar-
guments in favor of the third option, a single uniform definition.
The second area of analogous law discussed, FEHBAA,83 pro-
vides further support for a single uniform definition. The regulations
to the Act provide a single, statutory definition of gross miscon-
duct.284 Unlike the suggestions of some early commentators on CO-
BRA, regulations promulgated under FEHBAA, a law intended to
mirror COBRA, do not state that an employee's actions need be
"almost criminal. 285 Rather, according to the regulations, an act
constitutes gross misconduct if it is a "flagrant and extreme trans-
gression of law or established rule of action for which an employee
is separated and concerning which a judicial or administrative find-
ing of gross misconduct has been made.12 88
This definition is certainly useful, but it should not be lifted ver-
batim and incorporated into COBRA. Public and private sector em-
ployees are not traditionally treated identically.281 COBRA, for in-
281. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text (discussing a California court holding in
which conduct was found to be willful).
282. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text (discussing how discharge for just cause in
New York may not rise to the level of misconduct justifying disqualification).
283. H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 224, at 1.
284. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890.1102 (1992).
285. See 54 Fed. Reg. 52,333, 52,333 (1989); see also supra notes 231-36 and accompanying
text (discussing how gross misconduct under FEHBAA may include felonies and lesser criminal
offenses).
286. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890.1102 (1992) (emphasis
added).
287. COBRA, as applied to state and local government employees, is governed by the Public
Health and Safety Act and the Department of Health and Human Services. See supra notes 3-8
and accompanying text.
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stance, does not require a judicial or administrative finding of gross
misconduct. Public employment is more similar to private union em-
ployment in that public employers are generally subject to greater
restrictions and tighter regulation, such as progressive discipline and
discharge procedures. 88 Private employers, on the other hand, al-
though subject to ERISA, 289 Title VII,290 ADEA, 29 and the like,
are not subject to progressive discipline and discharge procedures 292
and therefore are given greater discretion over employment deci-
sions. For example, the regulations of FEHBAA call for a judicial
or administrative determination of gross misconduct.29 3 This re-
quirement is not applicable to private employers.2 4 As a result, any
statutory or regulatory amendment to COBRA should be designed
specifically for the private employer. 295 The solution, therefore, is to
gain insight from the first and second options, and to pursue the
third option.
C. A Single Uniform Definition
In pursuit of the third option, a single uniform definition of gross
misconduct under COBRA, employers should lobby Congress to
amend COBRA by adding a uniform definition of gross misconduct
or requiring the IRS to issue substantive regulatory guidance for
determining what conduct constitutes gross misconduct.
Allowing, or essentially requiring, administrators of ERISA em-
ployee benefits plans to rely on state law contradicts the broad hold-
ing of the Supreme Court in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.298 In FMC
288. FRANK ELKOURT & EDNA ASPET ELKOURT, How ARBITRATION WORKS 632-34 (3d ed.
1973) (discussing due process and procedural requirements in the context of discharge and
discipline).
289. 29 U.S.C. § 1145; ERISA § 515.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
291. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1988).
292. An exception would be when an employer puts into place discipline and discharge proce-
dures on which employees may rely.
293. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 5 C.F.R. § 890.1102.
294. See supra notes 226-33 (discussing how FEHBAA and its regulations are applicable to
federal employees only).
295. It would be appropriate for the state and local employers to adopt the definition of gross
misconduct provided under FEHBAA. Federal employment is, of course, more similar to state and
local government employment than that of private employment. COBRA amended both ERISA
and PHSA, the latter affecting local employees. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
Therefore, separate regulations and, thus, definitions of gross misconduct would be appropriate.
296. 111 S. Ct. 403, 403 (1990); see supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text (discussing
how ERISA requires that benefit plans be governed by a single set of regulations and not by the
patchwork system of regulation created by state unemployment law).
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Corp., the Supreme Court stated that the purpose behind the
ERISA preemption clause is to promote uniformity and circumvent
the frustration of employee benefit plan administrators administer-
ing ERISA plans nationwide. 97 Therefore, to avoid a "patchwork
scheme" which would result in "considerable inefficiencies in benefit
program operation," '298 ERISA's preemption clause should be en-
forced "to ensure that benefit plans will be governed by only a single
set of regulations. 1299 The Court specifically stated that ERISA em-
ployee benefit plans should be governed by a single set of
regulations.3 0 0
Although the savings clause exception to state law preemption re-
turns jurisdiction over insured employee benefit plans to the states,
under the deemer clause, self-insured employee benefit plans are
still exempt. 3 1 COBRA does not distinguish between insured and
self-insured group health plans.302 Therefore, an inconsistency might
result if state laws were relied upon. For example, assume two em-
ployees reside in the same state and work for the same employer.
Assume also that one is covered under an insured health mainte-
nance organization and the other is covered under a self-insured
traditional indemnity plan. Without a uniform definition, two sepa-
rate definitions may result, even though COBRA did not anticipate
a distinction based on how the group health plan was insured. If
both employees were allegedly terminated for the same gross mis-
conduct, one determination might be based on the state's unemploy-
ment law while the other might be based on the employer's own
definition of gross misconduct. Clearly this would present a situation
in conflict with the Supreme Court's position favoring uniformity
and circumventing the frustration of employee benefit plan adminis-
trators implementing ERISA plans.303
Unfortunately, the reality is that Congress is not likely to act with
due diligence on such a plea by private employers. Therefore, it
297. 111 S. Ct. at 408.
298. Id. (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. 'Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987)).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text (discussing how the savings clause returns
to states the power to enforce state laws regulating insurance while ERISA retains power over
self-insured plans under the deemer clause).
302. See 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988) (subjecting both insured and self-insured plans to COBRA).
303. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text (discussing how ERISA requires that ben-
efit plans be governed by a single set of regulations and not by the patchwork system of regulation
created by state unemployment law).
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would be in the best interest of such employers to approach Con-
gress armed with a proposed definition. 0 With this in mind, a sug-
gested uniform definition of gross misconduct, as well as regulatory
language for private employers, is included in the Appendix.
CONCLUSION
Just as Congress saw fit to include a definition in FEHBAA and
the Office of Personnel Management issued regulations interpreting
the gross misconduct provision for federal employers,3 °5 Congress
and the IRS should do the same for pri~ate employers attempting in
good faith to comply with COBRA.
Again, the nature of this option, getting Congress or the IRS to
act, does not present a realistic solution in the short term. For now,
a consistent application of a definition like the one included in the
Appendix should satisfy COBRA's good faith compliance require-
ment, and should provide employers with a clearer concept of what
is meant by gross misconduct.
Carol M. Hines
304. In United States R.R. Bd. v. Fritz, when the Railroad Retirement Board was threatened
with insolvency, representatives of the union and the railroads drafted a plan for changing the
retirement benefit qualification and distribution requirements, and then took their plan to Con-
gress, which enacted it into law. 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (stating that the manner in which the
legislation was enacted was constitutional).
305. See supra notes 230-39 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's definition of gross
misconduct and the OPM's determination that the definition is drawn from its meaning in the
legal community).
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APPENDIX
I. Proposed Amendment to Statutory Language of COBRA
Add to 29 U.S.C. § 1167, Definition and Special Rules:
(6) Gross Misconduct
(A) In General
The term "gross misconduct" means a flagrant, deliberate, or willful
act by an employee in violation of the law or established reasonable
rule, policy, or procedure of the workplace which results in such em-
ployee's termination.
(B) In Addition, (i) a connection must exist between the gross
misconduct and the employee's job; however, acts outside the work-
place may constitute gross misconduct for purposes of the Act
where an employer's interest is adversely affected; and (ii) the aver-
age employee must be able to understand or be on notice concerning
the consequences of the act(s) in question.
(C) An act(s) of negligence or carelessness does not constitute
gross misconduct unless excessive and adverse to an employer's in-
terest(s) and unless the employee was sufficiently warned.
II. Proposed Amendment to the June 15, 1987 Proposed Rules
Add to Question & Answer 15 in (c) after 11, ... of the covered
employee's employment:
In general, the term "gross misconduct" refers to a flagrant, de-
liberate, or willful act by an employee in violation of the law or
established reasonable rule, policy, or procedure of the workplace
which results in such employee's termination.
Examples
Gross Misconduct:
(1) An employee is terminated for committing a felony upon an-
other employee or the employer during work. Termination based on
such an act is for gross misconduct.
(2) A regional bank manager is terminated for committing theft
away from work. Termination based on this act is for gross miscon-
duct. Although the act took place away from work, it is adverse to
the employer's interest in having a trustworthy managerial employee
in a position of responsibility.
(3) An employee with access to employer trade secrets is termi-
nated for knowingly selling such secrets. Termination based on this
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act is for gross misconduct. The act was done in willful disregard of
the employer's interests.
NOT Gross Misconduct:
(1) An employee is terminated for high absenteeism. Termination
based on this does not constitute gross misconduct.
(2) A truck driver is terminated for refusing to accept a trucking
assignment. Termination based on this act may be just cause to ter-
minate but does not constitute gross misconduct.
(3) An employee is aware of the employer's termination policy for
breach of confidence and is terminated for such a breach. Termina-
tion based on an act of negligence or poor judgment does not consti-
tute gross misconduct.
